Legal and Political Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Water Shortage

Takayuki Oishi ()

No 39, Discussion Papers from Meisei University, School of Economics

Abstract: We develop normative investigation of sharing international rivers. First, we propose the model of water problems in the situation where a river flows through several states with the possibility of water shortage. We derive claims problems from the water problems. We axiomatize the family of convex combinations of the proportional and the equal awards rules for water claims problems. Using a unique claim vector constrained by geographic factors of a watercourse and the majority voting rule, we demonstrate how to determine the legal and political agreement of water problems.

Keywords: international river; claims problems; axiomatization; proportional rules; equal awards rules; median voter theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
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