What makes a joint venture: micro evidence from Sino-Italian contracts

Valeria Gattai and Piergiovanna Natale ()

No 218, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides new contract-level evidence on control rights allocation in order to define what makes a joint venture. Property rights theory of the firm identifies circumstances under which joint control alleviates investment distortions due to contract incompleteness. We compare predictions of the theoretical literature with actual governance structures of Sino- Italian joint ventures, as reported in a questionnaire submitted to the entire population of Italian enterprises operating in China. With an exceptional response rate of 60%, our evidence confirms most of the theoretical predictions and helps select among competing approaches to model joint ventures.

Keywords: contract incompleteness; China; Italy; joint venture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2012-01, Revised 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tra
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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper218.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What makes a joint venture: Micro-evidence from Sino-Italian contracts (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:218

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