Proportional Representation with Uncertainty

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni (), Elena Manzoni and Carlos Pimienta ()

No 288, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

Keywords: Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Legislative Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2014-12, Revised 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Proportional representation with uncertainty (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:288

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