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Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Astrid, Gamba, Giovanni Immordino and Salvatore Piccolo (salvapiccolo@gmail.com)

No 336, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: When Legislators award amnesties to `low-rank' criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may capture public officials to avoid being sanctioned. Optimal policies should anticipate this danger and fight it back by granting amnesties not only to low-rank criminals, but also to officials who plea guilty and report bribe givers. Even if the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to bribe prosecutors, these policies increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminals but also for low-rank ones, whereby increasing the risk premium that the latter require to participate the crime: the bright side of subversion of law.

Keywords: Criminal Organizations; Corruption; Leniency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D78 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2016-05-17, Revised 2016-05-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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