Is electoral punishment important for democracy? The role of social capital and religious resources

Ambra, Poggi

No 368, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: Electoral punishment is the main instrument that citizens have to keep government accountable, answerable and accessible to the people they serve. The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate whether individual social resources - social capital and religious resources - may enhance the probability that individuals value electoral punishment important for democracy. We use data from the 2012 European Social Survey Multilevel Data and a multilevelapproach. Our findings lend support to the view that social resources matter in determining the importance of electoral punishment, even if the importance of each resource varies across countries. Social capital has a complex effect on the importance of electoral punishment: trust reduces the probability that individuals value electoral punishment, while social participation increases it. Religious resources result negatively correlated with the importance of electoral punishment suggesting that loyalty versus religious values and traditions imply unconditional citizens’ support for government. Finally, some religions seem to have a specific role in enhancing the importance of electoral punishment confirming an active role of religious values and authorities in shaping individual political behaviors.

Keywords: electoral punishment; religion; social capital; poverty; multi-level models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C23 D72 I3 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2017-07-19, Revised 2017-07-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:368

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