The dual of Bertrand with homogeneous products is Cournot with perfect complements

Paolo Bertoletti ()

No 490, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions, the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; Bertrand duopoly; perfect complements; homogeneous products. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements (2022)
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