Endogenous interdependent preferences in a dynamical contest model

Fausto Cavalli, Mario Gilli and Ahmad Naimzada

No 492, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: Outcomes observed in laboratory experiments on contests are often not consistent with the results expected by theoretical models, with phenomena that frequently occur like overbidding or persisting oscillations in strategic choices. Several explanations have been suggested to understand such phenomena, dealing primarily with equilibrium analysis. We propose a dynamical model based on the coevolution of strategic choices and agent preferences. Each agent can have non self-interested preferences, which influence strategic choices and in turn evolve according to them. We show that multiple coexisting steady states characterized by non self-interested preferences can exist, and they lose stability as the prize increases, leading to endogenous oscillating dynamics. Finally, with an emphasis on two specific kinds of agents, we explain how overbidding can emerge. The numerical results show a good qualitative agreement with the experimental data.

Keywords: Contest models; Endogenous interdependent preferences; Coevolution of strategies and preferences; Multistability; Non convergent dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2022-03, Revised 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-mic
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