Exports, Jobs, Growth! Congressional Hearings on US Trade Agreements

Jieun Lee and Iain Osgood
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Jieun Lee: University of Michigan
Iain Osgood: University of Michigan

No 667, Working Papers from Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan

Abstract: Who testifies on US trade agreements before Congress and what do they say? We examine the content of Congressional testimony on US trade agreements, and the selection process which determines who testifies in the first place. We find that testimony is systematically tilted towards a sunny view of tradeÕs positive economic effects, while import competition and offshoring are generally downplayed. We argue that tradeÕs supporters strategically frame their motives for supporting trade agreements, and that pro-trade committee chairsÕ decisions on who testifies further skew testimony away from the distributive consequences of globalization within the United States. Congressional hearings on trade agreements therefore represent a key site where the influence of dominant pro-trade interests is both revealed and reinforced.

Keywords: Congress; trade agreements; Congressional hearings; globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 F50 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2018-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mie:wpaper:667

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