Explaining Corporativism and Corruption

Luis G. González-Morales

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics

Abstract: A simple contract-theoretic model is used to show that, in a democratic system, positive political rents and efficient provision of public goods can characterize an equilibrium in the political contest. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable under the assumption that a fraction of the political rents can be shared with a subgroup of voters through corporativist arrangements. These features correspond fairly well to the presidential and corporativist political system of post-revolutionary Mexico.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2001-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-reg
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