On Evolutionarily Stable Behavior in Contests

Wolfgang Leininger

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics

Abstract: It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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