Alliances between competitors and consumer information

Paolo Garella and Martin Peitz

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano

Abstract: Alliances between competitors in which established firms provide access to proprietary resources, e. g. their distribution channels, are important business practices. We analyze a market where an established firm, firm A, produces a product of well-known quality, and a firm with an unknown brand, firm B, has to choose to produce high or low quality. Firm A observes firm B's quality choice but consumers do not. Hence, firm B is subject to a moral hazard problem which can potentially be solved by firm A. Firm A can accept or reject to form an alliance with firm B, which is observed by consumers. If an alliance is formed, firm A implicitly certificies the rival's product. Consumers infer that firm B is a competitor with high quality, as otherwise why would the established firm accept to form an alliance? The mechanism we discover allows for an economic interpretation of several types of business practices

Keywords: alliances; brand sharing; asymmetric information; signaling; exclusion; moral hazard; entry assistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L15 L24 L42 M21 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Alliances between Competitors and Consumer Information (2007)
Working Paper: Alliances between competitors and consumer information (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2006-41

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