Context dependent games as quantifiers and selection functions

Jules Hedges, Paulo Oliva, Evguenia Winschel, Viktor Winschel and Philipp Zahn

No 14-13, Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use quantifiers and selection functions to represent simultaneous move games. Quantifiers and selection functions are examples of higher-order functions. A higher order function is a function whose domain is itself a set of functions. Thus, quantifiers and selection func- tions allow players to form goals not only about outcomes but about the whole (or parts) of the game play. They encompass standard pref- erences and utility functions as special cases, but also extend to non-maximizing behavior and context-dependent motives. We adapt the Nash equilibrium concept to our new representation and also introduce a refinement to capture the essential features of context-dependent motives. As an example, we discuss fixpoint operations as context dependent goals of coordination and differentiation in simultaneous game variants of Keyne's beauty contest and the minority game.

Keywords: context dependent refinement of Nash equilibrium; higher order functions; quantifiers; selection functions; beauty contest; minority game; endogenous economist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 D01 D03 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:wpaper:36178

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