When and how the punishment must fit the crime

George Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White

No 15-04, Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract: In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.

Keywords: Simple Penal Code; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Repeated Extensive Game; Optimal Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37483/1/Mailath%2C_Nocke%2C_White15-04.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME (2017)
Working Paper: When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (2015)
Working Paper: When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (2015)
Working Paper: When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37483

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