Borda Count Method for Fiscal Policy- A Political Economic Analysis -

Ryo Ishida and Kazumasa Oguro

Discussion papers from Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan

Abstract: Survey data reveals that government budgets tend to go into the red. Public Choice economists as well as public finance economists have been interested in this phenomenon. This paper presents a new explanation for this tendency from the political economic point of view; the current voting system might have a tendency to bring about a budget deficit. If policy choices only deal with the current tax rate and do not take into account the intertemporal tax rate, budget-balanced choice is difficult to be chosen. Even if voting choices take into account intertemporal aspects, we show that a budget-balanced choice is difficult to be chosen under relative majority rule. We further demonstrate that the Borda count method might overcome this issue.

Keywords: relative majority rule; Borda count method; deficit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mof:wpaper:ron294

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