It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game

Philip Grossman, Catherine Eckel, Mana Komai and Wei Zhan ()

No 01-17, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We address followers’ gender-based perception of leader’s effectiveness. Our experiment’s design removes factors that might affect leadership success, such as risk-taking and competitiveness. We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game; 10 periods without a leader and 10 periods after the leader makes a short, “scripted” speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings. Followers then choose a costly bonus for the leader. The leader’s gender is the only variable that changes across sessions. Followers are more likely to heed the advice of the male leaders, are less likely to ascribe success to female leaders, and reward male leaders more.

Keywords: Leadership; Gender; Coordination Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: It pays to be a man: Rewards for leaders in a coordination game (2019)
Working Paper: It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game (2016)
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