Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?
FangFang Tan and
Erte Xiao
No 06-18, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with third party punishment, we find groups punish more when the penalty embeds deterrence than when it can only be retributive. In contrast, individual third parties’ punishment decisions do not vary on whether the punishment has any deterrent effect. In general, third party groups are less likely to impose punishment than individuals even though the punishment is costless for third parties.
Keywords: Third-party punishment; group decision making; retribution; deterrence; social dilemmas; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence? (2018) 
Working Paper: Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? (2014) 
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