EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional

Martin Hellwig

No 2004_6, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, ”commodity specific greater risk aversion”, is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, ”uniformly greater risk aversion” is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.

Keywords: Multidimensional Risks; Risk Aversion; Risk Premia; Randomization in Incentive Schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2004_06online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Risk aversion in the small and in the large when outcomes are multidimensional (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large When Outcomes Are Multidimensional (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_06