Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision

Sven Fischer () and Andreas Nicklisch ()
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Sven Fischer: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Andreas Nicklisch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2006_23, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall efficiency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances efficiency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.

Keywords: Experimental economics; learning; minimal social situation; myopia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_23

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