Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Jos Jansen ()
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Jos Jansen: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

No 2009_06, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms.profits and the probability of innovation.

Keywords: R&D competition; innovation; spillovers; information disclosure; strategic substitutes; free-rider effect; externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L23 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-cta, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-knm, nep-mic and nep-tid
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