Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy

Felix Bierbrauer () and Martin Hellwig
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Felix Bierbrauer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2010_02, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs. This suggests an intriguing link between mechanism design for large economies and voting.

Keywords: Large Economy; Mechanism Design; Public-good provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_02online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Good Provision in a Large Economy (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_02

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