The Pareto-Frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation
Felix Bierbrauer () and
Pierre Boyer
Additional contact information
Felix Bierbrauer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
No 2010_16, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Abstract:
We characterize the Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. We show how the second-best frontier which incorporates incentive constraints due to private information on productive abilities relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource constraints into account. In particular, we argue that the second-best frontier can be interpreted as a Laer-curve. We also use this second-best frontier for a comparative statics analysis of how optimal income tax rates vary with the degree of inequity aversion, and for a characterization of optimal public-good provision. We show that a more inequity averse policy maker chooses tax schedules that are more redistributive and involve higher marginal tax rates, but chooses a lower public-goods provision level.
Keywords: Optimal Income Taxation; Public-good provision; Laer-Curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_16online.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Pareto-Frontier in a Simple Mirrleesian Model of Income Taxation (2014) 
Working Paper: The Pareto-Frontier in a Simple Mirrleesian Model of Income Taxation (2013) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_16
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().