Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties

Sophie Bade ()
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Sophie Bade: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2010_22, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.

Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion; Multiple Priors; Median Voter; Electoral Competition over many Issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_22

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