The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation

Andreas Glöckner (), Sebastian Kube and Andreas Nicklisch ()
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Andreas Glöckner: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Andreas Nicklisch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2011_30, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved punishment is unleashed when combined with observable punishment. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups – strikingly, even with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result underlines the importance of the coexistence of observed and unobserved sanctioning mechanisms in social dilemmas.

Keywords: Public Goods; Unobserved Punishment; Sanctioning Effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H40 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_30

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