Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision

Felix Briebrauer () and Martin Hellwig
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Felix Briebrauer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2011_31, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Public-good provision; Large Economy; Voting Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_31

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