The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab

Christoph Engel and Michael Kurschilgen

No 2011_32, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims. We show that the willingness to overcome a dilemma transcends self-interest. Cooperation is significantly higher in the presence of a meta-rule for the formation of customary law. Yet only if it is backed up by sanctions, law is significantly more effective than mere comity. Customary law guides behaviour into the normatively desired direction as normative expectations and behavioural patterns coevolve.

Keywords: experiment; Public Good; Customary Law; Normativity; Crowding Outs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C91 D03 D62 D63 H41 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_32

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