The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

Pascal Langenbach ()
Additional contact information
Pascal Langenbach: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2014_07, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however (experiment 2).

Keywords: communication; dictator games; generosity; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 D64 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06, Revised 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2014_07online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().