Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation

Olga Gorelkina

No 2014_11, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agent’s betting reward depends on how accurately the prior updated on his report predicts the type reports observed in the following period. The mechanism satisfies participation constraints and generates no deficit after any reported history.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanisms; scoring rule; Bayesian learning; conjugate priors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D71 D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_11

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