The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance

Alexander Morell ()
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Alexander Morell: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

No 2014_19, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different group identities among participants. They play a dictator game. Dictators either play with a recipient from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). Dictators condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much the dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment than in the outgroup treatment. From this and some corroborating findings I conclude that guilt aversion plays out more strongly across a short social distance.

Keywords: Guilt Aversion; Social Identity; Beliefs; Generosity; Experiment; Psychological Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11, Revised 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-neu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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