Abuse of Power – An experimental investigation of the effects of power and transparency on centralized punishment

Leonard Hoeft () and Wladislaw Mill
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Leonard Hoeft: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2017_15, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency

Keywords: Punishment; Public-Goods-Game; Designated Punishment; Abuse; Transparency; Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_15

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