Personal Information Disclosure under Competition for Benefits: Is Sharing Caring?

Viola Ackfeld and Werner Güth ()
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Viola Ackfeld: University of Cologne
Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

No 2019_04, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people’s information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally investigate these two factors by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side-effect.

Keywords: Personal information disclosure; Peer comparison; Incentives; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D30 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2019_04

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