Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms

Yoan Hermstrüwer ()
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Yoan Hermstrüwer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2019_11, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to prevailing assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural information and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be a sucient condition of fairness.

Keywords: matching markets; school choice; transparency; fairness; law and market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D47 I20 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-law and nep-ure
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