Does the threat of overthrow discipline the elites? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Konstantin Chatziathanasiou (), Svenja Hippel () and Michael Kurschilgen
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Konstantin Chatziathanasiou: University of Münster
Svenja Hippel: University of Würzburg

No 2020_27, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The threat of revolution disciplines the elites, inducing them to strategically share some of their wealth in order to prevent social unrest. This behavioral conjecture is prominently used to explain franchise extension and welfare state expansion. We test this conjecture in a controlled laboratory experiment. We model a society whose members can produce wealth by coordinating conflicting interests. Coordination is facilitated through a status-ranking. Compliance with the ranking yields an efficient yet inequitable payoff distribution. Between treatments, we vary (a) whether overthrows – which reset the status-ranking via collective disobedience – are possible or not, and (b) whether voluntary redistributive transfers – which high-status players can use to appease low-status players – are available or not. In contrast to established thinking, we find that, on average, the threat of being overthrown does not lead to more wealth-sharing as high-status players fail to provide sufficient redistribution to prevent overthrows.

Keywords: redistribution; franchise extension; revolution; elite behavior; coordination; battle of the sexes; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 H23 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11, Revised 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does the Threat of Overthrow Discipline the Elites? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_27

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