Lucky You: Your Case is Heard by a Seasoned Panel – Panel Effects in the German Constitutional Court
Christoph Engel
No 2021_05, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Abstract:
Panel effects have been widely studied in randomly composed panels. However for many courts, panel composition stays constant. Then judges become familiar with each other. They know what to expect from each other. Mutual trust may develop. A local culture may emerge. If rejection is the default, familiarity is likely to help plaintiffs, as familiar panels can be more effective, and more self-confident. In the German Constitutional Court, the effect of familiarity on three success measures can be causally identified: success on the merits, with the request for a preliminary ruling, or with a procedural request. Justices experience multiple, exogenous recompositions of their chamber. In the logic of regression discontinuity, the effect of familiarity on the alternative measures for success can be identified if these recompositions lead to a clear decrease in familiarity with the other members of the chamber.
Keywords: panel effect; German Constitutional Court; familiarity; regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 D71 D73 D91 H11 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-22, Revised 2022-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2021_05
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