Bargaining over Tax Information Exchange

May Elsayyad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper empirically studies recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the outcome of a bargaining process over treaty form. Havens can decide not to sign an agreement, to sign a tax information exchange agreement or to sign a double taxation convention. We use a highly stylized bargaining model to develop testable hypotheses with regards to the type of agreement signed. We show that the main determinants of treaty signing are a haven's bargaining power and good governance. We show that it is easier to renegotiate an already existent treaty to include information exchange than to pressure countries with no existent agreement.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:bargaining_over_tax_information_exchange

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