Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size

Christos Mavridis and Marco Serena

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53].

Keywords: Costly voting; pivotal voter model; complete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2018-07

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