Firm-Level Early Intervention Incentives: Which Recent Employers of Disability Program Entrants Would Pay More?

David C. Stapleton, David R. Mann and Jae Song ()

Mathematica Policy Research Reports from Mathematica Policy Research

Abstract: The authors used linked Social Security (SS) administrative data to analyze SS Disability Insurance (DI) program reform proposals that would hold firms partially responsible for a portion of the DI benefits paid to their recent employees.

Keywords: Early Intervention Incentives; Employers; Disability Program Entrants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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