Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives (Journal Article)

Ali Protik, Steven Glazerman, Julie Bruch and Bing-ru Teh

Mathematica Policy Research Reports from Mathematica Policy Research

Abstract: In this journal article, Protik et al. examine behavioral responses to an incentive program that offers high-performing teachers in 10 school districts across the country $20,000 to transfer into the hardest-to-staff schools in those districts.

Keywords: education; teachers; school; TTI; random assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/EDFP_a_00174#.ViU28v6FOot (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpr:mprres:a22112a4287340c58be8fe2b515fc249

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Mathematica Policy Research Reports from Mathematica Policy Research Mathematica Policy Research P.O. Box 2393 Princeton, NJ 08543-2393 Attn: Communications. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joanne Pfleiderer (info@mathematica-mpr.com) and Cindy George (cgeorge@mathematica-mpr.com this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).