The Political Economy of the Disability Insurance: Theory and Evidence of Gubernatorial Learning

Radha Iyengar and Giovanni Mastrobuoni ()

Mathematica Policy Research Reports from Mathematica Policy Research

Abstract: The dramatic rise in the disability insurance (DI) rolls in the last 20 years has been the subject of much controversy.

Keywords: Disability insurance; Principal-agent; Social security administration; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning (2014)
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