From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century

Monique Florenzano

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions

Keywords: General equilibrium; Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell public competitive equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; mechanism design; free-rider problem; incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B20 B21 H10 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century (2009)
Working Paper: From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09008

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