EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related choices

Julio Dávila and Marie-Louise Leroux

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In an overlapping generations economy setup we show that, if individuals can improve their life expectancy by exerting some effort, costly in terms of either resources or utility, the competitive equilibrium steady state differs from the first best steady state. This is due to the fact that under perfect competition individuals fail to anticipate the impact of their longevity-enhancing effort on the return of their annuitized savings. We indentify the policy instruments required to implement the first-best into a competitive equilibrium and show that they are specific to the form, whether utility or resources, that the effort takes

Keywords: Life expectancy; health expenditures; taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-hea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09057.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related choices (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related choices (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related choices (2009) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09057

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label (lucie.label@univ-paris1.fr).

 
Page updated 2025-01-02
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09057