Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Abderrahmane Ziad

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this methodological paper, we prove that the key tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988), extended to asymmetric regions, possesses a Nash equilibrium under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature: goods are supposed to be normal; the public good is assumed to be a desired good; the demand for capital is concave; and the elasticity of the marginal product is bounded. The general framework we develop enrables us to obtain very tractable results. By applying our method to several examples with standard production functions, we show that it is easy to use

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; tax competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H21 H42 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10037.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game (2010)
Working Paper: Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10037

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