Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Pauline Contou-Carrère () and Tristan Tomala
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Pauline Contou-Carrère: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases

Keywords: Finitely repeated games; semi-standard monitoring; folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10073.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2011)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10073

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