Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design

Monique Florenzano

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Focusing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accomodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions

Keywords: Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell-Foley equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; free-rider problem; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; principal-agent models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B20 B21 H10 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10084.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Government and the provision of public goods:from equilibrium models to mechanismdesign (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10084

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