Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners
Herve Boulhol
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Abstract:
This paper contributes to the literature that highlights the role of trading partners' institutions for a country's unemployment rate. The objective is to study whether the results established in the minimum wage setting of Davis (1998) hold when unemployment is driven by search frictions. This paper finds that relative labor market institutions matter for equilibrium unemployment as they generate comparative advantages, but there are two main differences with Davis. With North-North trade, unemployment decreases in the low-regulation country. When South is brought into the picture, low-regulation North is not insulated, and unemployment increases in both developed countries as a result of specialization
Keywords: Unemployment; labor market institutions; trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F16 F41 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-lab
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10091.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners (2011) 
Working Paper: Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10091
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