Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Frederic Koessler

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage games share the same simple structure, but differ markedly on how information should be optimally used once they are repeated. Despite the complexity of the optimal strategies, the empirical value of information coincides with the theoretical prediction in most instances. In particular, it is never negative, it decreases with the number of repetitions, and it is nicely bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game and above by the value of the one-shot game. Subjects are unable to completely ignore their information when it is optimal to do so, but the use of information in the lab reacts qualitatively well to the type and length of the game being played

Keywords: Concavification; laboratory experiments; incomplete information; value of information; zero-sum repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11002

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