On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium

Messaoud Deghdak () and Monique Florenzano
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Messaoud Deghdak: Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées et Modélisation - Université de Mentouri

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this paper, we establish the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium for games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge's strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge's strong games are essential

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; strong Berge equilibrium; fixed point; essential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11039.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ON THE EXISTENCE OF BERGE'S STRONG EQUILIBRIUM (2011)
Working Paper: On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium (2011)
Working Paper: On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11039

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