Redistribution by Means of Lotteries

Stephane Gauthier and Guy Laroque

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: A government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their preferences. The second-best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the awards are deterministic. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome. The condition requires that the citizens with large social weights have low risk aversion, and that the left tail of the distribution of risk aversion be sufficiently dispersed

Keywords: Lerner egalitarianism; random redistribution; incentives; qualified constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2015/15005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:15005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().