Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games: A differential approach
Joseph Abdou and
Nikolaos Pnevmatikos ()
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Nikolaos Pnevmatikos: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Abstract:
We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game following a differential approach. In such a game the stage payoffs depend on the current action and on the frequency of actions played so far. We associate in a natural way a differential game to the original game and although it presents an irregularity at the origin, we prove existence of the value on the time interval [0,1]. We conclude, using appropriate approximations, that the limit of Vn as n tends to infinity, exists and that it coincides with the value of the associated continuous time game
Keywords: stochastic game; frequency dependent payoffs; continuous-time game; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games: A differential approach (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:16076
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