Convexity of Graph-Restricted Games Induced by Minimum Partitions

Alexandre Skoda ()
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Alexandre Skoda: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We consider restricted games on weighted graphs associated with minimum partitions. We replace in the classical definition of Myerson restricted game the connected components of any subgraph by the subcomponents corresponding to a minimum partition. This minimum partition Pmin is induced by the deletion of the minimum weight edges. We provide five necessary conditions on the graph edge-weights to have inheritance of convexity from the underlying game to the restricted game associated with Pmin. Then, we establish that these conditions are also sufficient for a weaker condition, called F-convexity, obtained by restriction of convexity to connected subsets. Moreover, we prove that inheritance of convexity for Myerson restricted game associated with a given graph G is equivalent to inheritance of F-convexity for the Pmin-restricted game associated with a particular weighted graph G' built from G by adding a dominating vertex, and with only two different edge-weights. Then, we prove that G is cycle-complete if and only if a specific condition on adjacent cycles is satisfied on G'

Keywords: communication networks; cooperative game; convex game; restricted game; partitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17049

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