A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding ()
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Hans Keiding: University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex

Keywords: Delegation; compromise; simplicial complex; contiguity; strong homotopy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2018/18033.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise (2019)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:18033

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